Abstract
Introduction
The evolution of service development in the telecommunications sector, driven by the success of the Internet, creates a demand for dynamic service development in order to continuously develop new services in a competitive market. There is a need for fast incremental development of services and applications, while maintaining availability properties. Today services are offered in a connectionless and open environment making it more difficult to manage service availability. This paper focuses on the incremental development of means to ensure availability and to combine these means
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Compositional design allows us to put service components together and reuse the individual components. In service composition, service components may be statically combined or dynamically combined at run time. Services are defined in terms of collaborations among roles performed by actors. An important issue in service composition is ensuring the availability of service components so that it is possible to achieve correct collaboration of service roles across different actors and domains. For example, a service role needs to be accessible in the required actor at the required moment, and the requestor needs to be authorized to invoke the service role. Within a given actor, there may be dependencies between active roles or inner components interfering with availability of the required component or service role (the classical feature interaction problem) .
Security requirements, such as availability requirements, are often not taken into account by developers in the design process for many reasons such as time to market and costs constraints, and lack of knowledge about security amongst designers and developers, as well as the complexity of the environment in which systems are deployed [1] . It is a common view, however, that security services and mechanisms should not be added on to the system after it has been implemented, but should be taken into account and built into the system throughout the development process.
In [20] , we have presented a conceptual model for service availability. Based on the model presented in [20] , this paper addresses the aspect of availability of being able to ensure access to authorized users only. Our approach involves development of flexible and re-usable patterns to ensure availability in service composition. In this paper we motivate and introduce a set of authentication and authorization patterns, which may be composed with services to ensure that services are accessible to the authorized users only.
The main contributions of this paper are that we provide a framework and classification of authentication and author-ization patterns, and we demonstrate how the authentication and authorization (AA-) patterns can be composed with services to restrict access to services to authorized users only. This involves employing policies to specify rules for application of a specific pattern in a service collaboration, to define requirements on entities involved in the collaboration, and to specify constraints to e.g. prevent feature interactions. The policies are specified in OCL. Goals, and/or pre-/post-conditions are used for establishing constraints on ordering e.g. which roles/collaborations must have been played before the next role/collaboration can start.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we discuss the principles of service composition. In Sect. 3 we introduce our framework of authentication and authorization patterns and in Sect. 4, we demonstrate how we specify these patterns using UML 2.0 and we discuss how we apply policies. Use of AA-patterns in composition of services is addressed in Sect. 5. A discussion of related work is given in Sect. 6 followed by a summary and conclusion in Sect. 7.
Service composition
We define a service as an identified partial functionality, provided by a system, component, or facility, to achieve desired end results (goals) for end users or other entities. The most general form of service involves several service components, collaborating to provide the service to one or more service users (being human or technical). The new UML 2.0 collaboration concept [18] provides a structured way to define partial functionalities in terms of collaborating roles and therefore it provides a promising basis for service modelling. It allows service components to be modelled as collaboration roles, and service behavior to be specified using interactions, activity diagrams and state machines as explained in [21] . Moreover it provides means to decompose/compose services using collaboration uses and to bind roles to classifiers defining system components. For instance, the collaboration in Fig. 1 specifies an authentication service in terms of two collaboration roles authenticatee and authenticator.
Behavior descriptions can be associated with the collaboration to precisely define the service behavior, including precise definitions of the visible interface behavior. Note that the special case of a single interface service may be modeled using a two-way collaboration. As explained in [22] , two-way collaborations provide a framework to define so called semantic interfaces, i.e. interfaces with behavior and goal expressions that can be used for service discovery and to ensure compatibility with respect to safety and liveness (i.e. reaching the desired goal states) when linking service components.
If services were independent of each other, service com- As Fig. 2 shows, service components interact with each other for the actual execution of services. The structure and linking of service components is to a large extent dynamic. Therefore, dynamic linking is a fundamental and general mechanism required in service-oriented systems. Important mechanisms for service discovery, feature selection, compatibility validation, and access control can be associated with the creation and release of dynamic links. Interactions between roles and agents are needed primarily in the process of creating and releasing dynamic links, that is, the pro-cess of dynamic role binding. The policy driven approach to dynamic role binding described in [4] is useful for ensuring that availability requirements are met in service composition.
Framework for AA-patterns
Our framework consists of a classification of authentication and authorization techniques as patterns specified using UML 2.0 collaborations, with interactions and state machines. We also specify the AA-patterns using semantic interfaces [22] to facilitate validation of visible interface behavior for each of the roles involved in a collaboration and to enable dynamic composition of AA-patterns and services.
We specify behavior using semantic interfaces because semantic interfaces facilitate checking the compatibility (in terms of safety and liveness properties) of different components involved in service collaboration (Interface behaviors are derived from the complete component behaviors by projection). We declare role-binding policies in the semantic interface for each of the roles involved, as we find this useful for validating that the required conditions and requirements have been fulfilled when composing the pattern with services. In the following sections we present our classification of AA-patterns.
Authentication patterns
Authentication theory and practice has evolved over time and is well established in the literature [2, 16, 17] , as well as in the standards [10] [11] [12] 14, 15] . The simplest authentication patterns involve two parties. Variations involve proxies, or trusted third parties. By a third party we mean a component, service or organization, which both other parties are willing to rely on. In some cases, each party relies on a different trusted third party, who in turn trust each other through a trusted third party. We begin therefore, by addressing patterns involving two parties, as these can be generalized or extended to involve trusted third parties.
In order to apply authentication protocols and techniques in a model-based approach, we have classified these well known authentication techniques and protocols as authentication patterns specified using UML 2.0 collaborations, which may be combined with service components in service composition [19] . By doing this we aim to make the developer more conscious in the choice of authentication pattern, e.g., whether unilateral or mutual authentication is required, is there an issue such as timing regarding the number of messages involved e.g., one-pass, two-pass or three pass, or should symmetric or asymmetric keying be used, before choosing the protocol and algorithm in the instantiation of the pattern. Fig. 3 
Figure 3. Authentication patterns
A generic two party authentication pattern involves communication between the two parties to establish the identity of one of the parties in the case of unilateral authentication, or both in the case of mutual authentication. Messages are generated and exchanged between the parties, at least one message/pass is required for unilateral authentication, and at least two messages/passes are required for mutual authentication. These are generic patterns that do not bind a particular protocol or algorithm. Once a generic pattern is selected, the strength of authentication can be further differentiated in specializing the pattern depending on the type of keying, e.g., symmetric or asymmetric, to be used. The generic patterns are then further specialized with respect to the authentication technique, or cryptographic protocol and algorithm(s) to be applied, e.g., for the unilateral two-pass authentication pattern, the HTTP digest authentication protocol with the MD5 hash algorithm may be applied [8] . By doing this, we separate out the choices that must be made by the developer, and pinpoint each of the levels of specialization for awareness. This is because it is not enough to choose a general model and apply just any technique or protocol and assume that required level of security is achieved. There are altogether too many examples illustrating that depending on choices at each of these layers, the actual implementation can be flawed.
One example of this is the Microsoft challenge/reply handshake protocol, used in Microsoft's Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP). In this example, a design flaw in the protocol and a choice of a weak password hashing algorithm both contributed to the reported weakness of the authentication implementation [23] . Additionally, there were other flaws in the implementation itself. It is because flaws may be introduced at different stages in authentication design and implementation that we have chosen to classify patterns separating stages of specialization. These stages are as follows: First, a general pattern is chosen from the classification in Fig. 3 . Then, the pattern is specialized according to technique, e.g., if crypto is to be employed, then a choice must be made between symmetric or asymmetric keying, and then a protocol must be chosen along with algorithms or functions required by the protocol. If desired, an original protocol and algorithm may be designed for the application and specified during the design process. This allows the developer to analyze the strength of the authentication at each stage of specialization of the models, so that flaws may be discovered and corrected.
It is important to distinguish between weak versus strong authentication, and weaknesses and errors that arise simply due to implementation errors. The strength of the authentication pattern can be tuned with respect to the combination of the protocol, the algorithm and the key-length. However, errors in implementation can significantly weaken the authentication mechanism delivered. Assurance techniques such as e.g. use of the Common Criteria [13] may help in the latter.
For example, the unilateral one pass authentication pattern may be specialized as illustrated in Fig. 4 . There is a class for all unilateral one pass patterns employing symmetric crypto techniques, that is for which the authenticating party and the party requesting authentication share a common secret key which is used in the crypto protocol. Similarly, there is a class for all unilateral one pass patterns employing asymmetric crypto techniques, and a class for all patterns for which the unilateral one pass authentication algorithm employs a Hash function. 
Authorization patterns
In order to describe any authorization pattern, it is important to recognize that any authorization pattern requires that authentication has been performed before any authorizations may be granted. Authentication and authorization patterns are combined to describe how access rights are granted. Additionally, an access control model is required for access rights administration. Well known examples of access control models are e.g., discretionary access control, mandatory access control, role-based access control, and others [7] .
There are two basic authentication and authorization architectures [7] :
User Pull: Authentication is performed by an access server, which also issues authorizations to the user. The user then presents authorizations directly to the service.
Server Pull: The service centralizes information about user entity authorizations on an access server. The service authenticates the user. When the user attempts to access the service, the service queries the access server to determine whether the user is authorized.
These architectures provide a means for handling authorizations in a centralized manner. The role of access server is played for e.g. issuing and storing authorizations associated with the user role. How the authorizations are activated and administered is described by the access control model to be deployed such as role-based access control (RBAC).
Specifying AA-patterns

Using UML 2.0 collaborations
A UML 2.0 collaboration diagram for the generic two party authentication pattern is given in Fig. 5 . The collaboration diagram shows that the authenticatee role cooperates with the authenticator role. The properties of the roles are defined by aType and bType. A specialization of this pattern for unilateral two pass authentication is shown in Fig. 1 of Sect. 2 above. Using this specialization, an agent is able to authenticate another agent using a challenge response sequence in two passes. This view shows the goal for the collaboration, expressed in OCL. A detailed view is given in Fig. 6 . This view allows us to express more concisely the properties that the instances must have in order to participate in the pattern. Any instance playing the authenticatee role must possess the properties specified by responder and any instance playing the authenticator role must possess the properties specified by challenger. The instance playing the authenticatee role must possess a secret, and the instance playing the authenticator role must possess knowledge that is mathematically related to the secret. This formalization of the mathematical relationship between secret and knowledge has been chosen in order to be general enough to allow for alternative crypto protocols to be specified at later stages in development. Note that if symmetric keying is used, then secret = knowledge. The instance playing the authenticator role must be able to generate a challenge, which is sent to the instance playing the authenticatee role, and validate the response. Similarly, the instance playing the authenticatee role must be able to generate a response to the challenge. We model the User Pull authentication and authorization services as a UML 2.0 collaboration that defines three collaborating participants that interact to implement the user pull authentication and authorization behavior: these are the User, Access Server, and Service Access Filter roles. Application of certain AA-patterns to the User Pull services is represented by three collaboration uses as illustrated in Fig. 7 and explained in the following:
TwoPartyAuthenticate: This pattern, which we have modelled as a UML 2.0 collaboration in Fig. 5 and specialized for unilateral two pass authentication in Fig. 1 and Fig. 6 , is shown in Fig. 7 bound to the User and Access Server roles. Here, the authenticatee role is bound to the User role, and the authorisor role is bound to the Access Server role. For the instantiation of this pattern, it is expected that an appropriate two party authentication pattern is chosen and applied as described in Sect. 3.1. and further explained in Sect. 4.1. AApatterns Auths Activation: This pattern consists of a request by the instance playing the authsrequestor role for authorizations to be activated and sent to the instance playing the authsrequestor role. The authorizations govern which services the user is allowed to access. The way in which the authorizations are activated depends on the access control model that is used. This pattern is invoked after the collaboration TwoPartyAuthenticate has reached its goal of e.g., unilaterally authenticating the authenticatee. In the User Pull collaboration, Auths Activation is shown bound to the User and Access Server roles. CheckingAccessRights: This pattern is invoked whenever the instance playing the User role requests access to a service. The instance playing the authoriser role then checks the authorizations to establish whether the instance playing the User role shall be granted access to the service. In the User Pull collaboration, Checking Access Rights is shown bound to the User and Service Access Filter roles.
User Access Server
Service Access Filter U A s 1 : T w o P a r t y A u t h e n t ic a t e
In order to administer access rights, an interface to a rolebased access control (RBAC) infrastructure is required, although not visible at this level of abstraction. RBAC-role activation rules, and authorization rules are administered by the RBAC infrastructure, and distributed to the AA-patterns and services. Therefore, there must be an interface towards an RBAC infrastructure. Policies are enforced based on RBAC-role activation rules and authorization rules. RBACactivation rules are used to manage and activate RBACroles acquired by the agent. For example, a service role may or may not be allowed to be played by an agent depending on the RBAC-roles acquired by the agent. See [19] for the full classification.
Using semantic interfaces
In [22] it is described how semantic interfaces can be defined based on role modeling and simple goal expressions. The focus is on checking the compatibility of different service components involved in the provisioning of a service. Definition of semantic interfaces allows us to validate the interface behavior rather than validating the complete component behavior. Semantic interfaces facilitate validation of both safety and liveness properties. It is pointed out in [22] that UML 2.0 does not adequately describe interface behavior, protocol statemachines are not sufficient, and the authors propose a specification of interface behavior using transition charts as shown in Fig. 8 below.
In this figure, the UML 2.0 Collaboration for unilateral two-pass authentication is shown with two transition charts to show the role behavior of the two collaboration components in a unilateral two-pass challengeresponse authentication pattern. These diagrams, together with goal expressions specifying properties of desirable states and events, define the semantic interface of the UniTwoPassAuthenticate collaboration. In addition to syntactical interfaces, semantic interfaces define the visible interface behavior and goals of the collaboration. In this case, the semantic interface defines the interface behavior and goals of the authenticatee and authenticator roles.
AA-patterns and policy
Collaborations describe re-usable elements. During instantiation of a collaboration, various checks are needed to ensure that the participating agents can satisfy the requirements (policy, properties).
In [4] three policy categories are identified:
• Role-binding policies, which constrain the binding of roles to agents at run-time.
• Collaboration policies, which express constraints that must hold for a collaboration as a whole when it is instantiated. They aim at preventing actions that may compromise the intentions and goals of the collaboration. 
Figure 8. Semantic interface for UniTwoPass Authenticate
• Feature-selection policies, which control the triggering of context-dependent service features. These policies describe preferences or privileges, and are held by the corresponding Agent instances.
In this paper we use these categories as a basis for our discussion of policy applied to AA-patterns and service composition, however, we augment the definitions. Our classification of policies is also motivated by [9] . We see a collaboration policy as a requirement, or objective for the overall collaboration behavior of the pattern, in order for the collaboration to be instantiated. Our notion of a rolebinding policy specifies requirement/objectives specifically for the instance playing a certain role in the collaboration. In the context of authentication patterns, a collaboration policy is as such a requirement/objective for the collaborative behavior of the authentication pattern as a whole, whereas the role-binding polices are defined specifically for each of the two collaboration roles, authenticatee and authenticator.
Collaboration policies state pre-and post-conditions for the instantiation of the collaboration.
Role-binding policies may consist of:
• Constraints on what the agent playing the role is allowed to do.
• Requirements that the agent must satisfy in order to play the role, e.g., in order for the collaboration to be successful with respect to service availability requirements.
• Constraints on which agents are allowed to play the role.
Role-binding policies may be used to check the compatibility of the role with the agent playing the role. Such compatibility rules can be checked on the interfaces, along with other behavioral checks. A feature-selection policy defines a kind of profile held by the agent and may consist of:
• Resources available.
• Type of terminal/node/user equipment that the agent is deployed on, e.g., the terminal is a 3G telephone with a smartcard.
• Operating System/ or software supported.
• Preferences of the agent.
• Privileges held by the agent.
• Other contextual parameters.
In the context of AA-patterns, feature selection policies define restrictions on service features imposed by the authorization policy. A collaboration role participating in an AA-pattern may have requirements on what the agent must be able to support in order to play a role. We therefore need to determine that the agent has the properties/characteristics required in order to play the role, such as support for a specific algorithm. If it is determined that the algorithm to be used is not supported, it may also be possible to push this out (as a sort of extension to the role play) to the agent allowing for the role to be played anyway.
The following outlines how policy is applied in our modeling:
1. The policies are stated using OCL. Conditions are stated as pre-conditions, and actions are stated as postconditions. For example, if the invariants and preconditions stated in the role-binding policy are satisfied, then the post-condition is that the instance plays the role.
2. Policy controls are performed at runtime, on the interfaces, using semantic interfaces.
The collaboration view shown in Fig. 6 is useful for expressing role-binding policies. The declarations shown in Fig. 6 and explained in Sect. 4.1 are incorporated in the role binding policies. The purpose is to specify the required properties of the actors playing the roles, independently of Figure 9 . Role binding policy for an instance playing the authenticatee role choice of crypto protocol and algorithm selected at later stage of development. We express these policies in OCL as shown in Fig. 9 for the authenticatee role.
The role-binding policy expressed in Fig. 9 states that the instance playing the authenticatee role must possess a secret, and it must be able to generate a response to the challenge sent by the authenticator. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the instance can play the authenticatee role. Similarly, the instance playing the authenticator role must possess knowledge that is mathematically related to the secret assigned to the instance playing the authenticatee role, and it must be able to to generate a challenge, which is sent to the authenticatee, and to validate the reponse. In order for the collaboration to run, both of the role-binding policies must be fulfilled. The collaboration policy for the instantiation of the UniTwoPassAuthenticate pattern is given in Fig. 10 .
{ C o n te x t c :U n iT w o P a s s A u th e n tic a te P re : R e la tio n (c .a u th e n tic a te e .s e c re t, c .a u th e n tic a to r.k n o w le d g e ) P o s t: s e lf.in s ta n tia t e }
Figure 10. Collaboration policy for the instantiation of UniTwoPassAuthenticate
An example of a condition that can be stated in the rolebinding policy, is a condition on support in the agent (terminal/node/user equipment) for a particular protocol and algorithm, such as the unilateral two-pass authentication using the HTTP digest authentication protocol with the MD5 hash algorithm as specified in RFC2617 [8] . Another example is specification of constraints on processing time involved in running the algorithm to ensure that timing constraints are fulfilled. This is particularly important for real time applications and services.
We have found that it is useful to declare the role binding policies in the semantic interfaces along with the goals for use in validation that the security properties are preserved in composition of the pattern with services. The policies allow us to validate that the required conditions are fulfilled in order for the authentication pattern to run correctly and so that availability requirements in service composition can be satisfied when composed with this authentication pattern. This allows policy rules to be checked to determine compatibility of the role, whether the actor/agent is authorized to play the role, or even whether the actor/agent will allow the playing of a particular role.
Using AA-patterns in service composition
AA-patterns behavior may be invoked in two different situations:
When creating a new session, by performing a role request and performing dynamic role binding. This requires general mechanisms to ensure that the role is invoked only if authentication and authorization policies are satisfied. If role R is requested, and a policy specifies that authentication and authorization is performed first, then the necessary AA behavior must be performed first and a desired goal must be reached before the service is invoked. In this case an AA goal is a precondition for the service invocation.
During session behavior, this is required when the session and its roles contains features or accesses objects that demand fine-grained, dynamic authorization. This case is trickier because it requires a tighter integration of service behavior and AA behavior. In our work, we model this using service access filters, and policies, e.g. restricting role behavior. This entails adding screening behavior that filters out unauthorized operations. This requires that it may be possible to force termination of a session if authorizations are no longer valid. We have currently modeled this as an Interrupt collaboration (not shown). Another approach is to invoke a restricted role behavior only capable of doing authorized operations. Applying the appropriate rolebased access control model for issuing authorizations, and checking authorizations upon accessing a particular service or object makes such fine-grained, dynamic authorization possible.
Let us assume a Service S defined as a semantic interface with roles r1 and r2 as shown in Fig. 11 . Further assume that agent A requests a session of Service S, and role r2 from agent B as shown in Fig. 12 .
The collaboration Service S may have a policy P3 specifying that the agents playing r1 and r2, in our case agents A and B, shall be different agents, and possibly restrict the type of the agents, e.g. that both shall be User Agents, or that one shall be a User Agent and one a Service Agent. In this case, we specify that the collaboration policy states that agent A shall be a User Agent and agent B shall be a Service Agent. The agents may specify conditions that govern which roles can be played by the agent. Agent B may, for instance, specify that a precondition for invoking r2 is that agent A is authenticated and authorized e.g. applying Userpull. Similarly, agent A may specify that a precondition for invoking r1 is that agent B is authenticated and authorized. It is natural to express these conditions as part of the role-binding policies, using OCL. If the AA properties have not been established yet then, it is necessary to invoke AA services resulting in the desired AA properties before invoking Service S. In the most general case agent A and agent B must negotiate and agree on the AA-patterns to apply. In many cases agent B may select the patterns and return the decision to agent A. Then the AA-services are performed and only if successful, is the requested Service S invoked. In order to demonstrate composition of service S with AA-patterns, we decompose Service S as shown in Fig. 12 .
In Fig. 13 we demonstrate composition of Service S with the User Pull authentication and authorization patterns.
This involves the following two patterns in addition to the ones we have considered so far: RequestServiceAccess and AA ServiceUse. These two patterns are needed in order to enable the instance playing the ServiceAccessFilter role to act as a proxy between the instance playing the User role, and the instance playing the Service role. This enables the instance playing the Service role to require authentication and authorization before allowing a UserAgent to access it. The Service S session may require additional, fine grained authentication, and authorization checks, however, and this calls for screening or other mechanisms during service execution, unless it is possible to constrain the service that is invoked to what is permitted.
This example demonstrates how use of the detailed view for the UniTwoPassAuthenticate pattern given in 6 facilitates composition of AA-patterns and services, as it shows the collaboration more or less as it would appear in a collaboration use with the roles named on the connectors, as shown in Fig. 13 . Consequently, declaring the role-binding policies for each pattern is made easier. These policies are linked under dynamic composition and must be checked against each other to ensure that the composition is correct [4] . The roles on the connectors may also be specified using semantic interfaces. The overall collaboration policy, and the collaboration policies for each of the collaboration uses are represented in Fig. 13 . These policies For example, P3, the collaboration policy for Auths Activation states that in order for the collaboration Auths Activation to instantiate, the goal of UniTwoPassAuthenticate must have been reached.
Related work
Yoder and Barcalow [24] were the first to apply design patterns to the security domain. Since then, there have been several others. However, authentication patterns are seldom addressed even though patterns for authorization [5] and for access control (such as the Single Access Point Pattern designed by Yoder [24] ) are addressed. Brown, Divietri, Villegas, and Fernandez have documented a high level design pattern for authentication of clients to a server [3] . Consistent with our approach, the pattern allows for the implementation of different authentication methods such as passwordbased, challenge response, or multiple challenge response. However, our approach to designing patterns allows for application of the authentication pattern to the peer-to-peer environment as well. Additionally, we provide a means to specify more details at later stages of development depending on the requirements of the authentication protocol and algorithm. In [6] Fernandez and Warrier provide an authorization pattern, integrated with a variant of the authenticator pattern. This authorizer pattern is actually an application of Yoder and Barcalows single-point-of-check pattern [24] , and is also an example of a server pull authentication and authorization architecture. Although these and other different authors have addressed authentication patterns and authorization patterns separately, we are not aware that a framework addressing authentication and authorization patterns exists. To our knowledge, application of such a framework to service composition is also a new approach.
Conclusions
We have presented a framework for authentication and authorization patterns together with an approach to composing services and AA-patterns to provide services satisfying availability requirements regarding the aspect of being able to ensure access to authorised users only [20] . This involves specification of the AA-patterns using UML 2.0 collabora-tions and semantic interfaces. See [19] for full definition of the framework. We have demonstrated how the specifications may be annotated with role-binding policies and collaboration policies to enable us to validate that required conditions and availability requirements hold when composing AA-patterns with services.
The presented approach is useful for application to service composition because there are significant differences between different authentication techniques that must be modeled for use in service composition, depending on the service collaboration roles and service behavior involved. This validates the need for a finer-grained classification of authentication patterns as discussed in Sect. 3.1 above.
In our current work we are investigating general, policy driven, mechanisms that can be used to achieve a dynamic approach to composing AA-patterns and services.
